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Abstract— Despite the benefits offered by smart grids, 
energy producers, distributors and consumers are increasingly 
concerned about possible security and privacy threats. These 
threats typically manifest themselves at runtime as new usage 
scenarios arise and vulnerabilities are discovered. Adaptive 
security and privacy promise to address these threats by 
increasing awareness and automating prevention, detection 
and recovery from security and privacy requirements’ failures 
at runtime by re-configuring system controls and perhaps even 
changing requirements. This paper discusses the need for 
adaptive security and privacy in smart grids by presenting 
some motivating scenarios. We then outline some research 
issues that arise in engineering adaptive security. We 
particularly scrutinize published reports by NIST on smart 
grid security and privacy as the basis for our discussions.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The smart grid promises sustainability, reliability and 
higher awareness of energy generation, distribution and 
consumption, by managing the electricity grid with 
information technology. However, rich features and 
interfaces of smart grid can introduce vulnerabilities and 
increase security and privacy risks. For example, deploying a 
weak authentication method by a customer may lead to 
unauthorized remote access to his/her meter data. Although 
security and privacy concerns in electricity grids are not new 
(illustrated by $6 billion in losses due to fraud in the US 
alone in 2009 [1]), the smart grid extends the attack surface 
through its augmented interfaces and improved flexibility of 
access to services and information.  
Although security and privacy requirements at “design 
time” have been discussed extensively since the early 
initiatives of smart grids, these requirements may be 
incomplete, may fail or might no longer be satisfied by a 
system during its operation (at “run time”). This may be the 
result of changing critical assets in the grid (such as energy-
related information or appliances), emerging threats, or 
varying environmental conditions. Moreover, architecture 
and design decisions as well as deployed technologies |(such 
as adopting cloud computing architectures), could have 
security and privacy implications for the smart grid. Such 
implications may only be observed during operation or as 
consequences of failures in the grid (e.g., blackouts). All 
these cases need to be detected and managed at run time 
efficiently and effectively. 
Adaptive software models and technologies promising to 
address some of these issues by handling uncertainty and 
automating monitoring, analysis, decision-making, and the 
application of security controls. Indeed, security controls can 
be adapted to protect critical assets continuously across all 
the seven domains of the smart grid identified by NIST [2]: 
transmission, distribution, bulk generation, operations, 
service provider, markets and customer domains.  
In the rest of this paper, first we review security and 
privacy concerns in smart grids. Then we investigate 
demands for adaptive security and privacy in this domain. 
Finally, we outline software engineering research issues in 
realizing adaptation in smart grids. 
II. SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN SMART GRIDS 
This section briefly reviews security and privacy issues 
in the smart grid, particularly using NIST reports. 
A. Security  
Protecting valuable assets within a system boundary is 
the ultimate goal of security. In a smart grid, energy is a 
primary critical asset that needs be protected across a very 
wide and often changing system boundary. However, related 
data, such as meter data, audit trails, billing and pricing data, 
customer information, financial and marketing data, can also 
be as valuable as energy. Furthermore, equipment and 
services for metering, energy distribution, transmission, load 
management and information transmission and processing 
also need to be protected. To this end, some well-known 
security goals need to be achieved and maintained for these 
assets [3]:  
• Confidentiality of electricity market data, corporate 
information, customer information, and meter data; 
• Availability to deliver in-range time latency for control 
signals, meter reading, power quality information, 
incident response plus availability of power-enabled 
devices belonged to customers; 
• Integrity to ensure source of data is authenticated, 
timestamp is known, quality of data is known, and data 
or control commands are not intercepted; 
• Accountability to ensure who is responsible for 
commands in the grid, and all signals and events are 
audited in a proper way  
Possible threat agents for these goals in almost all seven 
domains include [3]: foreign countries, some employees, 
hackers, and industrial competitors, to name a few. Threat 
motivations include energy theft, sabotage, revenge, 
monetary gain, and mistakes.  
Depending on the adopted architecture, technology, and 
the awareness of human agents, different vulnerabilities may 
be introduced to the system. For instance, to lower costs, the 
computational ability of meters may be limited. This can lead 
to using weaker security controls such as weaker encryption 
algorithms. Outdated firmware, slow network connections, 
insecure remote configurations or patch updating are few 
other possible vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be 
exploited in a variety of ways. For example, Carpenter et al. 
[4] describe possible attacks for Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI), including power and clock glitching, 
fuzzing, and malicious framework patching. 
One of the current trends in smart grid is the use of cloud 
architectures. For example, IBM and C&W are developing a 
UK national smart energy cloud. Verizon and AT&T are also 
working on cloud-based smart grid1, which leverages the 
combination of mobile and cloud computing. Multi-tenancy, 
storing data in several jurisdictions, and cross-organizational 
data access in cloud environments could increase risk of 
protecting critical assets. On the mobile side, vulnerabilities 
of firmware and applications may also be problematic.  
B. Privacy 
Smart grids collect, transmit and store vast amounts of 
privacy-sensitive data about people, which can be extremely 
attractive to other people and businesses. NIST has 
considered four aspects of privacy: personal information, 
personal privacy, behavioral privacy, and personal 
communication [3]. Personal data available in the smart grid 
includes: name, address, banking information, meter data, 
bill, in-house energy generation, and energy and service 
provider(s) [3]. Moreover, other information can be inferred 
from this data. For instance, life styles and usage patterns can 
be extracted from meter data using data mining techniques.  
NIST points out that information may be exploited by 
different agents for a variety of purposes in smart grids [3]:  
• Insurance companies: determining health care premiums 
based on customers’ life styles 
• Marketers: advertising based on usage patterns  
• Police and law enforcers: identifying illegal or suspicious 
behavior (e.g., planting marijuana) 
• Landlords: verifying lease compliance 
• Criminals: Remote surveillance  
• Fraudsters: Attributing energy consumption to others 
Privacy requirements are needed to protect privacy-
sensitive information in order to mitigate risks of misuse by 
the above agents.  
III. DEMAND FOR ADAPTIVE SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
This section discusses triggers for adaptive security and 
privacy in smart grids through some motivational scenarios. 
A. Adaptive Security  
Security requirements are describe the need to protect assets 
in a system boundary. As noted by Shorter and Hollenbaugh 
[9], asset protection is key activity in automating security 
                                                            
1 http://gigaom.com/cleantech/verizon-brings-the-smart-grid-to-the-cloud/ 
management for smart grids. However assets in the smart 
grid boundary may change. Possible changes include adding, 
removing, or changing criticality (i.e., value) of assets due to 
contextual factors. Consider the following scenario related to 
changing assets:  
Scenario A – A new organization is established in a 
building. Valuable devices are moved into the building and 
critical information is collected, stored and processed in the 
organization.  
In this scenario, security of energy, related equipment, 
and information are all changing for this building, and need 
to be examined. Asset changes increase security risks, which 
in turn might render security controls ineffective or might 
change the priorities of security requirements. Devices (such 
as electrical appliances) may be sabotaged remotely, shut 
down, or be manipulated with malicious intent. Power-
enabled security controls can be also be compromised to 
access information and sensitive devices.  
Other than assets, contextual changes (e.g., economic), 
newly discovered vulnerabilities (e.g., bugs in the system), 
and failures of security controls may lead to similar 
situations. In such cases, proactive adaptation can 
reconfigure security controls to mitigate high risks. In 
Scenario A, critical devices can be protected by stronger 
access control to energy sources and management systems.  
On the other hand, reactive actions may be required to 
respond to incidents and detected abnormalities. For example 
assume the following scenario:  
Scenario B – Actual electricity usage in an area does not 
match with the reported meter data. This might be a sign of 
energy theft, although leakage in the distribution network or 
malfunctioning transformers could cause the same problem. 
In this scenario, adaptive security will check integrity of 
data and audit trails to investigate root causes of the problem. 
Auditing levels can be adjusted and stronger counter-
measures applied temporarily to prevent possible fraud. 
Salehie et al. [5] analyzed AMI security requirements and 
discussed some possible security cases. For example, if the 
audit trail frequently overflows, it might be a sign of 
tampering with the meter or altering metering data. 
The way customers and organizations in the smart grid 
access data and services is also important in security and 
should be considered during adaptation. Access to the grid’s 
critical data and services through browsers or mobile apps, 
via insecure devices and data networks, may need adjustment 
to security controls at runtime.  
B. Adaptive Privacy 
NIST recommends that privacy use cases should be 
developed to track information flow inside the smart grid to 
identify and mitigate privacy threats [3]. However, during 
the system operation private information might be revealed 
or inferred by unauthorized parties, similar to incidents in 
mobile phones. Adaptive privacy aims to monitor 
information transmission actively in the grid to detect and 
mitigate possible threats.  
One of triggers for adaptive privacy is contextual change, 
such as changes in spatiotemporal factors. Consider the 
following scenario for this case:  
Scenario C – A VIP or celebrity is moving to a house 
permanently or temporarily. Different parties may find this 
person’s private information beneficial, for example: press 
and marketing agencies.  
In this scenario, privacy policies need to be adjusted to 
control transmissions of energy-related information in this 
new building. In many situations, mobility can introduce 
these contextual changes and privacy concerns. Consider the 
following scenario: 
Scenario D – A person charges his electrical car en route 
when he is travelling. The fee is applied to his electricity bill, 
which means the companies owning the power stations 
report the expenses to the utility company with whom this 
person has a contract.  
In this scenario, a person’s location, trip plans, and long-
term behavior can be revealed to several companies. This 
person may want to know who knows what about him, and 
be notified if any of these companies share this information 
with other businesses (e.g., car insurance agencies). To deal 
with these scenarios, adaptive privacy needs to monitor 
information transmission, detect possible privacy threats, and 
mitigate them. 
IV. ENGINEERING ADAPTIVE SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
This section outlines software engineering research issues in 
realizing adaptive security and privacy in smart grids. We 
use the terminology used by Salehie and Tahvildari [8], in 
which an Adaptation Manager (AM) is defined as the 
external embodiment of the adaptation loop. 
A. Monitoring and Analysis 
The AM needs to monitor and analyze changes in the grid 
and its environment at runtime. NIST defines continuous 
monitoring requirements [3] (e.g., SG.CA-6) that are useful 
for this purpose, although the human role is central in ful-
filling them. A major challenge in monitoring and analysis is 
uncertainty due to imprecision and limited knowledge. 
Uncertainty is particularly relevant in the security domain, 
for example, for measuring risk. Therefore, the AM would 
probably detect false positive and negative threats and 
attacks; for example, an energy leakage might be detected as 
energy theft. In the following we list potential artifacts and 
attributes for monitoring and analyzing in adaptive security 
and privacy.  
Requirements – Requirements can be considered as the 
reference input (baseline) to the AM. In this way, smart grid 
security and privacy requirements are presented as runtime 
entities to be monitored for detecting any requirements 
denial, frequent denials, conflict, or possibility of not being 
able to be satisfied anymore. Research work on requirements 
at runtime, such as requirements-awareness [14], can be 
useful in monitoring and analyzing requirements for 
adaptation. Requirements at runtime also enable AM to even 
modify security requirements, if necessary. 
Assets – As noted before, assets should be monitored to 
track changes in situations similar to Scenario A. An asset is 
either primary, as the ultimate target of security threats, or 
secondary, that often needs to be compromised to access 
related primary assets [7]. A runtime asset model can be use-
ful to track these changes in both asset types, for example in 
the customer domain, by considering the uncertainty of 
evaluating assets. By linking such a model to corresponding 
requirements and conceivable attacks ensuing risk fluctua-
tions can be analyzed. A causal network is useful for this 
purpose e.g., the fuzzy causal network by Salehie et al. [6]. 
Context – Due to possible security and privacy 
ramifications arising from contextual changes, as shown by 
Scenarios A, C and D, significant contextual attributes 
should be monitored and analyzed at runtime. A promising 
approach to considering privacy violation is through the use 
of contextual integrity framework [15]. This framework 
posits that different parties should abide by certain 
transmission principles in the transfer of privacy-sensitive 
information in each context. For the smart grid, contextual 
integrity may be a suitable framework, since it represents an 
explicit model of a sender, receiver and a subject when 
disclosing personal information, and the transmission 
principles that guard the interaction process between these 
entities [16]. Examples of such transmission principles are 
notice, consent, confidentiality, fiduciary, secrecy, and 
reciprocity [15]. 
B. Decision Making  
Given perceived security and privacy events, the AM needs 
to decide how to respond. Making decisions in adaptation is 
often under uncertainty and deals with multiple objectives. 
Risk-adaptation – All security adaptation triggers can be 
aggregated and presented as risk changes. For example, a 
causal network can be used to analyze the impact of asset 
variations on risk and adjust security controls accordingly 
[6]. The uncertainty of domain experts and incompleteness 
of evidences can be captured by fuzzy or probabilistic 
representation of security entities and requirements. Using 
causal reasoning is also promising in assessing the effect of 
other changes, such as new vulnerabilities, on risk. The risk-
adaptive approach can complement the continuous risk 
monitoring envisioned by NIST [13].  
Privacy Threat Mitigation – Given monitored 
contextual factors, we should figure out what techniques can 
be used to reason over ensuing privacy threats. In deciding to 
adapt, sensitivity of threatened data, history of previous 
violations, the obfuscation level, and the ability to infer 
behavioral privacy from disclosed information should be 
considered. For instance a utility function can be defined 
based on these factors as a basis for adjusting selective 
disclosure policies.  
Multi-objective Decision-making – Preserving security 
requires monitoring and tracking details of protected assets, 
customers’ behaviors and meter data. On the other hand, 
privacy aims to avoid revealing personal information. 
Therefore, adaptive security and privacy actions can be in 
conflict. The AM should adapt these two and other quality 
requirements such as usability and performance. Decision 
theory and machine learning techniques may be helpful to 
address this issue in the smart gird, as they have been in the 
general adaptive software domain [8].  
C. Architecture 
IT and ICS – Smart grid architectures are built upon IT and 
Industrial Control System (ICS) infrastructures. Although 
these two use different technologies, risk management 
approaches for them are similar [9]. Vulnerabilities and 
security controls listed by NIST for ICS [10] are also similar 
to their IT counterparts. In both, monitoring and auditing 
need rigorous architectural support for adaptation. Adaptive 
software architectures need to leverage the NIST continuous 
monitoring process [13] at runtime, by considering 
adjustable monitoring and auditing levels to minimize 
overheads.  
Hierarchical Design – Considering the scale of the 
smart grid, a major challenge is the architecture of AMs and 
how they communicate with each other. NIST discusses 
requirements for local and centralized monitoring and 
control [3]. These requirements and components in the seven 
designated domains should be considered in arranging 
adaptation managers in a hierarchical structure. Following 
the reference architecture of autonomic computing [12], 
orchestration should be taken into account between security 
and privacy AMs and other managers for optimizing and 
healing.  
Cloud Architecture – Adopting the cloud architecture 
for smart grids has an impact on governance, compliance and 
trust (e.g., data location and ownership). A private or 
community cloud may be more appropriate to minimize 
negative effects on privacy and security. But in any selected 
deployment model, due to numerous parties involved in the 
grid, adaptation needs to manage access control and auditing 
in the cloud, among other things. Adaptation is especially 
required to mitigate risk of multi-tenancy. For example, 
adaptation manager may identify data items related to 
customers that need to be migrated to private hosts, if a 
hybrid cloud model is deployed, to mitigate the risk of data 
disclosure in multi-tenant hosts. Adaptation should also 
consider security and privacy concerns in mobile cloud 
applications. 
Human Involvement – Adaptation does not mean that 
human will not play any role in monitoring, analysis and 
decision-making in the grid. Due to high level of uncertainty 
in security and privacy management, and the criticality of 
assets, a human-in-the-loop and/or on-the-loop styles should 
be deployed. For example in the former case, a customer is 
actively involved in reacting to a meter security warning, 
while in the latter (s)he is simply notified that an action has 
taken place. In the on-the-loop style, the customer can 
change the adaptation behavior off-line.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Critical cyber-physical assets in the smart grid need to be 
protected continuously in proactive and reactive ways at run 
time. Security and privacy requirements, policies and con-
trols may need to be adapted due to possible changes in as-
sets, contextual factors, threats or vulnerabilities. In 
engineering solutions for adaptive security and privacy in the 
smart grid, a variety of research issues should be considered 
in monitoring, decision-making and architecture. Notable 
research challenges include dealing with uncertainty in 
monitoring, multi-objective decision-making, and addressing 
smart grid architecture concerns, such as multi-tenancy in 
cloud hosts.  
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